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Abstract 
This paper deals with optimal income taxation and relative consumption under a 
welfarist government that fully respects people’s preferences and a paternalist 
government that does not share the consumer preference for relative consumption. 
Consistent with previous findings, relative consumption concerns typically lead to 
higher marginal income tax rates in the welfarist case. A remarkable result is that the 
optimal tax rules turn out to be very similar when people’s preferences for social 
comparisons are not respected. Indeed, if the relative consumption concerns are based 
on mean value comparisons and all consumers are equally positional, or if they are 
driven by within-type comparisons, the paternalist and welfarist governments can 
implement their respective first-best allocations through exactly the same marginal 
income tax formulas. Yet, also in these cases, there are some remaining differences 
that follow from second-best considerations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Ever since the writings of Adam Smith in the 18th century, it has been well-known in 
economics that people care about status and social comparisons, and that relative 
consumption indeed matters to most of us.1 Tax and other policy implications of such 
comparisons have more recently been explored from different points of departure in a 
number of studies, including Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Oswald (1983), Tuomala 
(1990), Persson (1995), Corneo and Jeanne (1997), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), 
Dupor and Liu (2003), Abel (2005), Frank (2008), and Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman (2008, 2010, 2013).2 A typical finding in this literature is that the 
externalities generated by relative consumption concerns motivate considerably 
higher marginal tax rates than in the conventional model of optimal taxation without 
social comparisons. However, as is always the case, the theoretical results depend on 
the underlying assumptions. Indeed, a common assumption in all these studies is that 
the tax policy is decided by a welfarist government, i.e., a government that fully 
respects all aspects of consumer preferences, including concerns for relative 
consumption. While the welfarist assumption in normative economic analysis is 
standard, and often seen as uncontroversial, one may argue that this is less obvious 
when it comes to social comparisons. Indeed, Harsanyi (1982, p. 56) argues that the 
government should not respect what he refers to as anti-social preferences, of which 
envy is one example given. Since positional concerns imply that an individual’s utility 
depends negatively on other people’s consumption, one could interpret this as envy 
and, following Harsanyi, argue that the government should not respect such 
                                                 
1 This argument also finds strong support in recent research on happiness and questionnaire-based 
experiments showing that relative consumption is an important determinant of individual well-being 
(e.g., Easterlin, 1995, 2001; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005; Solnick and Hemenway, 2005;  Carlsson et al., 2007; Clark and Senik, 2010). 
2 Although there was for a long time in the 20th century little discussion on normative implications of 
relative consumption concerns, there were of course exceptions. Moreover, such issues were often 
taken more seriously by classical economists. For example, Mill (1848) argued that quite often 
consumer choice “is not incurred for the sake of the pleasure afforded by the things on which the 
money is spent, but from regard to opinion, and an idea that certain expenses are expected from them, 
as an appendage of station.” He concluded that: “I cannot but think that expenditure of this sort is a 
most desirable subject of taxation” (Principles of Political Economy, Book 5, Chapter 6). 
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preferences and hence not include the effects of relative consumption in the social 
objective function.3  
 
In the present paper we do not take a stand on the appropriateness of different 
assumptions regarding the social objective. Instead, we simply analyze the 
implications of a paternalist approach and compare them with those of the welfarist 
approach. One may presume that the induced higher marginal income taxes due to 
social comparisons based on the welfarist approach will simply vanish if the analysis 
is instead based on a paternalist approach where preferences for social comparisons 
are not respected. It turns out, however, that such a conjecture is importantly wrong. 
In fact, a paternalist government may respond in a way similar to – or even in exactly 
the same way as – a welfarist government, although for a different reason. 
 
The present paper thus supplements earlier research based on the welfarist approach 
to first-best (e.g., Persson, 1995; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Dupor and Liu, 2003) 
and second-best optimal income taxation (e.g., Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 
2008, 2010) by considering the case where consumer preferences for relative standing 
are of no concern to the government. The point of departure is the discrete variant of 
the Mirrleesian optimal income tax model with two productivity types developed by 
Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982), which will be extended to accommodate consumer 
preferences for relative consumption, and where information asymmetries typically 
prevent the government from implementing a first-best resource allocation. This 
model gives a useful analytical framework – based on a reasonably simple structure – 
for understanding the policy incentives associated with correction and redistribution 
as well as their interaction through the incentive constraint. Also, in this model, a 
first-best tax policy follows naturally from the special case where the incentive 
constraint does not bind, which simplifies comparisons with earlier research 
considerably. 
 
                                                 
3 According to Frank (2005), this is also one likely reason why many economists have been reluctant to 
base policy analyses on models where the consumers are positional. Yet, as also argued by Frank, 
positional concerns need not necessarily reflect anti-social preferences. Instead they might reflect 
instrumental reasons such as the need for families to keep up with community spending to be able to 
live in areas where their children may attend schools of reasonable quality. 
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As far as we know, our study is the first to more systematically compare the 
paternalist and welfarist approaches to optimal taxation under relative consumption 
concerns from a theoretical point of view. Yet, there are a few previous studies on 
paternalist approaches to optimal taxation in economies where the consumers are 
concerned with their relative consumption. Dodds (2010) and Kanbur and Tuomala 
(2010)4 compare the optimal income tax policy of welfarist and paternalist 
governments in the context of numerical models. A linear income tax is considered in 
the former paper, whereas the latter deals with optimal nonlinear income taxation. The 
numerical results show that relative consumption concerns among consumers may 
motivate much higher marginal tax rates than in the absence of such concerns, even if 
the consumer preference for relative consumption does not affect the policy objective 
(provided, of course, that the government, nevertheless, recognizes the associated 
behavioral effects). Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013) instead examine the optimal 
structure of commodity taxation and allow the consumption-externality caused by 
relative consumption comparisons to be non-atmospheric (such that individuals differ 
in their contribution to this externality) and asymmetric (meaning that people use 
different reference points). They show that both a welfarist and a paternalist 
government may implement a first-best resource allocation through personalized 
commodity taxation and that the principle of targeting does not generally apply if the 
(welfarist or paternalist) government is restricted to using uniform commodity taxes. 
 
The paper closest to ours is Micheletto (2011), who analyzes optimal income taxation 
in a second-best setting where he also considers the case of paternalism. He uses a 
quite specific model, where each productivity type compares his/her consumption 
with that of the adjacent type with higher productivity (meaning that the highest 
productivity type is not concerned with relative consumption). We will return to his 
results below. Our study is more general and differs from his in several important 
ways. First, we consider a broader spectrum of possibilities by analyzing the tax 
policy implications of (i) the mean value comparison (which is the conventional 
assumption in earlier comparable studies based on the welfarist approach), (ii) within-
                                                 
4 This is the working paper version, which was subsequently published as Tuomala and Kanbur (2013). 
However, in the journal version the section based on a paternalist government is dropped. 
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type comparisons, and (iii) upward comparisons.5 Second, we consider the incentives 
underlying both first-best and second-best taxation, meaning that we are able to 
compare our results with a fairly large body of literature on tax policy and relative 
consumption based on welfarist models. Third, we present the optimal tax policy in 
terms of degrees of positionality, i.e., the extent to which people’s utility gain from 
increased consumption is driven by the preferences for relative consumption, which 
makes it possible to interpret the results in the light of such estimates from the 
empirical literature on social comparisons. 
 
The outline of the study is as follows. In Section 2, we present a benchmark model 
where each individual compares his/her consumption with the average consumption in 
the overall economy. The implications for first-best and second-best taxation are 
analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 concerns the tax policy implications of the alternative 
comparison forms mentioned above, i.e., within-type and upward comparisons, 
respectively, while Section 5 provides a summary and a discussion. Proofs are 
presented in the Appendix. 
 
2. A Two-Type Economy with Relative Consumption and Nonlinear Taxation 
 
Consider an economy with two types of consumers, a low-productivity type (type 1) 
and a high-productivity type (type 2), where productivity is measured by the before-
tax wage rate. There are 1n  individuals of the low-productivity type and 2n  
individuals of the high-productivity type; 1 2N n n= +  denotes total population. Output 
                                                 
5 The empirical evidence here is scarce. Some evidence suggests that people compare their own 
consumption with that of people who are similar to themselves (e.g., Runciman, 1966; McBride, 2001; 
Clark and Senik, 2009), which in our setting may justify comparisons within productivity groups, while 
other evidence is more in accordance with upward comparisons (e.g., Bowles and Park, 2005). We also 
interpret Veblen (1899) in terms of upward comparisons, as he argued that people in other social 
classes are influenced by the behavior of, and try to emulate, the wealthy leisure class. 
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in this economy is produced by a linear technology such that the before-tax wage rates 
are fixed.6 
 
2.1 Consumer Behavior and Preferences for Relative Consumption 
 
Each consumer derives utility from his/her absolute consumption and use of leisure, 
respectively, as well as from his/her consumption relative to that of referent others. 
The utility function faced by a consumer of productivity type i (i=1,2) is given by 
 
 ( , ) ( )i i i i i iU v x z σ= + ∆ , (1)  
  
where ix  denotes consumption, iz  leisure, and i∆  the individual’s relative 
consumption. For technical convenience, the relative consumption is defined as the 
difference between the individual’s own consumption and a measure of reference 
consumption, rx , such that i i rx x∆ = −  (as in, e.g., Akerlof, 1997; Corneo and 
Jeanne, 1997; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Bowles and Park, 2005; and Carlsson et 
al., 2007).7 To begin with, we consider the conventional mean value comparison, 
where the reference consumption is given by the average consumption in the economy 
as a whole, i.e.8 
 
1 1 2 2
r n x n xx x
N
+
= ≡ . 
We assume that the functions ( )iv ⋅  and ( )iσ ⋅  are strictly quasi-concave and increasing 
in their respective arguments. Note also that equation (1) allows for differences in 
                                                 
6 This assumption simplifies the calculations; it is of no significance for how relative consumption 
concerns affect the optimal tax policy.  
7 An obvious alternative would be to assume that the individual’s relative consumption is determined 
by the ratio between the individual’s own consumption and the relevant reference measure (e.g., as in 
Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Layard, 1980; Abel, 2005; and Wendner and Goulder, 2008). It is not 
important for the qualitative results which option is chosen. 
8 Earlier studies on optimal income taxation and relative consumption typically assume that individuals 
compare their own consumption with the average consumption in the economy as a whole. Exceptions 
are Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010), who also analyze the policy implications of within-
generation and upward comparisons, respectively, faced by a welfarist policy maker, and Micheletto 
(2011), who considers a variant of upward comparisons.     
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preferences between types. The separable structure is convenient, as it makes it easy 
to distinguish between a welfarist government (which respects consumer preferences 
for relative consumption) and a paternalist government (which does not). However, 
none of the results derived below depend on this functional form assumption. 
Alternative comparison forms and measures of reference consumption will be 
addressed in Section 4. 
 
We show below that the strengths of the relative consumption concerns are important 
determinants of the optimal tax policy, irrespective of whether the government has a 
paternalist or welfarist objective. Based on Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002), the 
strength of the consumer preference for relative consumption will be measured by 
“the degree of positionality,” which is interpretable as the fraction of an individual’s 
overall utility gain from an additional dollar spent on consumption that is due to 
increased relative consumption. This means that if the degree of positionality equals 
zero then only absolute consumption matters, as in the conventional model, whereas a 
value equal to one means that only relative consumption matters on the margin. An 
alternative interpretation is that the degree of positionality reflects the welfare cost to 
the individual, measured per unit of consumption, of an increase in the level of 
reference consumption. For an individual of productivity type i, the degree of 
positionality is given by 
 
 
i
i
i i
xv
σ
α
σ
∆
∆
=
+
.        (2) 
 
Throughout the paper, subscripts attached to the utility function denote partial 
derivatives such that /i i ixv v x= ∂ ∂  and /
i i iσ σ∆ = ∂ ∂∆ . The assumptions made earlier 
imply that (0,1)iα ∈ , whereas iα  would be equal to zero in the absence of any 
preference for relative consumption. The average degree of positionality measured 
over all consumers in this economy can then be written as 
 
1 1 2 2n n
N
α αα +≡ .       (3) 
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The average degree of positionality gives an indication of how important the relative 
consumption concerns are on average in the economy as a whole. With mean-value 
comparisons, it is also a measure of the marginal positional externality per unit of 
consumption (since all individuals contribute to this externality to the same extent 
under such comparisons). Empirical estimates of the average degree of positionality 
suggest that relative consumption is an important determinant of individual well-
being; Wendner and Goulder (2008) argue that this number is typically found in the 
interval 0.2-0.4, whereas Alpizar et al. (2005) and Carlsson et al. (2007) find that the 
average degree of positionality (measured for income) is around 0.5. Some estimates 
from happiness studies suggest even higher values. These numbers are clearly 
consistent with Frank’s (2005) argument that positional externalities cause large 
welfare losses. 
 
The individual budget constraint can be written as 
 
 ( ) 0i i i i iw l T w l x− − = , (4) 
 
where iw  denotes the before-tax wage rate and il  the hours of work, measured by a 
time endowment less the time spent on leisure. The function ( )T ⋅  represents the 
income tax. We assume that each consumer is small relative to the economy as a 
whole and behaves as an atomistic agent by treating iw  and rx  as exogenous. The 
first-order condition for work hours can then be written as 
 
 ( ) (1 '( )) 0i i i i i ix zv w T w l vσ∆+ − − = . (5) 
 
In equation (5), '( )T ⋅  is the marginal income tax rate. Note that this optimality rule is 
of course independent of whether the government is paternalist or welfarist. 
 
2.2. The Government 
 
The government is assumed to be able to observe income, i.e., the product of the 
before-tax wage rate and the hours of work, whereas individual productivity (and 
consequently the hours of work) is private information. Similar to a great deal of other 
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literature on optimal taxation, we assume that the government wants to redistribute 
income from high-productivity to low-productivity individuals, meaning that it must 
prevent the high-productivity individuals from becoming mimickers. The following 
self-selection constraint is therefore imposed: 
  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2ˆ( , ) ( ) ( ,1 ) ( )U v x z v x l Uσ φ σ= + ∆ ≥ − + ∆ = .     (6) 
 
The weak inequality (6) constrains the redistribution policy: It implies that this policy 
must not be such that a high-productivity individual will prefer the allocation intended 
for the low-productivity type (which the high-productivity individual can reach by 
reducing his/her hours of work and select the income-consumption point intended for 
the low-productivity type). 2Uˆ  denotes the utility of a high-productivity mimicker and 
1 2/ 1w wφ = <  the relative wage rate. Therefore, 1lφ  represents the labor supply 
chosen by the mimicker, and 1 2ˆ1 l zφ− =  is interpretable as the leisure used by the 
mimicker (with the time-endowment normalized to unity). 
 
By using ( ) 0i i i
i
n T w l =∑  together with the private budget constraints given in 
equation (4), we can write the public budget constraint as 
 
i i i i i
i i
n w l n x=∑ ∑ .       (7) 
 
The public decision problem is to design a Pareto-efficient tax policy by maximizing 
utility for one of the productivity types subject to a minimum utility restriction for the 
other, as well as subject to the self-selection and budget constraints given in equation 
(6) and (7), respectively. We follow convention in writing the public decision-
problem as a direct decision problem, where consumption and work hours serve as 
direct decision variables. We can then infer the marginal income tax rates implicit in 
the socially optimal resource allocation simply by comparing the first-order 
conditions of the social decision problem with the private first-order conditions for 
work hours. Note that both the self-selection constraint and the public budget 
constraint are of course independent of whether the government is paternalist or 
welfarist. 
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2.2.1 The Paternalist Government 
The paternalist government does not share the consumer preference for relative 
consumption. Instead it behaves as if ( , ) ( )i i i i i i iv v x z U σ= = − ∆  is the objective 
faced by productivity type i. In other words, it wants the consumer to maximize utility 
net of the relative consumption term. The public decision problem then becomes 
 
 
1 1 2 2
1 2 2
, , ,
s.t. , (6) and (7)
l x l x
Max v v v≥ . (P-Gov) 
 
In problem (P-Gov), 2v  is a fixed minimum utility level that the government imposes 
on the high-productivity type. Note that although the government does not derive 
utility from the consumers’ preferences for relative consumption, these preferences 
are, nevertheless, part of the self-selection constraint given in equation (6), since the 
purpose of this constraint is to make each high-productivity individual choose the 
combination of work hours and consumption intended for his/her productivity type. 
Also, the government is assumed to recognize that the reference consumption is 
endogenous and given by 1 1 2 2 1 2( ) / ( )rx x n x n x n n= ≡ + + . 
 
The Lagrangean corresponding to this decision problem can be written as 
 
 1 2 2 2 2ˆ ( )i i i iP
i
v v v U U n w l xµ l γ  = + − + − + −    ∑L , (8) 
 
where subscript P refers to “paternalist,” while µ , l , and γ  are Lagrange 
multipliers. The first-order conditions for 1l , 1x , 2l , and 2x  become 
 
1 2 1 1ˆ 0z zv v n wlφ γ− + + = ,       (9a) 
1
1 2 2 1ˆ ˆ( ) 0Px x
nv v n
N x
l σ γ∆
∂
− + − + =
∂
L
,     (9b) 
( ) 2 2 2 0zv n wµ l γ− + + = ,      (9c) 
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( )
2
2 2 2 2 0Px x
nv v n
N x
µ l σ γ∆
∂
+ + − + =
∂
L
.     (9d) 
 
The partial derivative of the Lagrangean with respect to x , /P x∂ ∂L , measures the 
change in social welfare (from the perspective of the paternalist government) of 
increased reference consumption, ceteris paribus, and will be analyzed more 
thoroughly below. 
 
2.2.2 The Welfarist Government 
 
For purposes of comparison, we also address the optimal tax policy decided by a 
welfarist government, which incorporates the consumer preferences for relative 
consumption in its own objective. This decision problem was previously examined by 
Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) and is given by 
  
 
1 1 2 2
1 2 2
, , ,
s.t. , (6) and (7)
l x l x
Max U U U≥ . (W-Gov) 
 
The corresponding Lagrangean becomes 
 
1 2 2 2 2
0
ˆ ( )i i i iW
i
U U U U U n w l xµ l γ  = + − + − + −    ∑L .  (10) 
  
The first-order condition for 1l  and 2l  coincides with equation (9a) and (9c), 
respectively, whereas the first-order conditions for 1x  and 2x  change to read 
 
1
1 1 2 2 1ˆ ˆ( ) 0Wx x
nv v n
N x
σ l σ γ∆ ∆
∂
+ − + − + =
∂
L
,   (9b’) 
( )( )
2
2 2 2 0Wx
nv n
N x
µ l σ γ∆
∂
+ + − + =
∂
L
.    (9d’) 
 
In equations (9b’) and (9d’), /W x∂ ∂L  measures the partial welfare effect of increased 
reference consumption from the perspective of the welfarist government. In the 
following section, we will address the implications of equations (9) for optimal 
income taxation. 
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3. Optimal Taxation Results 
 
In the economy set out above, the government is unable to observe individual 
productivity and must, therefore, redistribute subject to the self-selection constraint. 
As such, if the self-selection constraint binds, the government cannot rely on 
productivity type-specific lump-sum taxes for purposes of redistribution. However, if 
the self-selection constraint does not bind, asymmetric information no longer prevents 
the government from redistributing through productivity type-specific lump-sum 
taxes, meaning that the sole purpose of marginal income taxation will be to correct for 
market failures (under a welfarist government) or behavioral failures (under a 
paternalist government). In turn, this provides a natural starting point by allowing us 
to discuss first-best taxation before turning to the second-best tax policy. 
 
3.1 Corrective Policy in a First-Best Setting 
 
Consider a simplified version of the model set out above where the self-selection 
constraint does not bind, in which 0l = , implying that both the paternalist and 
welfarist governments may implement their respective first-best (i.e., full information) 
resource allocation. It is important to emphasize that the concept of “first best” just 
means the best that each government can accomplish under full information about 
individual productivity, given its objective and resource constraint. Therefore, since 
the paternalist and welfarist governments have different objective functions, it follows 
that the first-best allocation based on a paternalist objective typically differs from the 
first-best based on a welfarist objective. Our purpose here is to compare the marginal 
tax policy used by a paternalist government to implement its first best allocation with 
the corresponding marginal tax policy used by a welfarist government. 
 
If 0l = , it is straightforward to derive (see the Appendix) 
 
0P
x
∂
=
∂
L ,                         (11a) 
0
(1 )
W N
x
αγ
α
∂
= − <
∂ −
L
.                        (11b) 
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Therefore, while increased reference consumption is of no concern to the paternalist 
government as long as the self-selection constraint does not bind, increased reference 
consumption leads to a welfare loss from the point of view of the welfarist 
government through increased positional externalities. Despite this, the corrective tax 
policy implemented by a paternalist government need not necessarily differ from that 
of its welfarist counterpart. To see this, let '( )i i PT w l  and '( )
i i
WT w l  denote the 
marginal income tax rate implemented for productivity-type i by the paternalist and 
welfarist government, respectively, and consider Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that the self-selection constraint does not bind ( 0l = ) and 
that the relative consumption concerns are based on mean value comparisons. The 
optimal marginal income tax rates implemented by the paternalist government can 
then be written as 
 '( )i i iPT w l α=  for i=1,2, 
while the welfarist government implements the following rates: 
 '( )i i WT w l α=  for i=1,2. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1 relates the optimal tax policy to the degrees of positionality, i.e., the 
extent to which the utility gain of increased consumption is driven by the preferences 
for relative consumption. Recall that the welfarist government respects the consumer 
preferences for relative consumption and tries to internalize the externalities that the 
consumers impose on one another through these concerns. With mean value 
comparisons, each consumer contributes to the positional externalities to the same 
extent and the average degree of positionality, α , represents the value of the marginal 
externality per unit of consumption, which explains the second formula in the 
proposition. This welfarist tax formula is analogous to results derived in the context of 
representative agent models by, e.g., Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and Dupor and Liu 
(2003), and of course also to the two-type model in Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 
(2008).  
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A paternalist government, on the other hand, is not concerned with externality 
correction, as it gives no weight to relative consumption concerns in the social 
objective function, which can also be seen from equation (11a). In the light of this 
observation, the optimal tax policy of the paternalist government may seem both 
highly surprising and unintuitive. Yet, the underlying intuition is actually 
straightforward to explain, as follows: 
 
Since the paternalist government does not include relative consumption concerns in its 
objective function, it wants the consumers to behave as if they were not concerned 
with their relative consumption. Hence, the government designs the marginal tax 
policy accordingly, and correspondingly taxes away people’s utility gains from 
increased relative consumption. The size of this “relative utility gain” is, in turn, 
obviously measured by the individual’s own degree of positionality, iα . Therefore, 
the marginal income tax rate imposed by the paternalist government depends on the 
individual’s own degree of positionality.  
 
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1: 
 
Corollary 1. Suppose that (a) the self-selection constraint does not bind ( 0l = ), (b) 
the relative consumption concerns are based on mean value comparisons, and (c) the 
type-specific degrees of positionality, 1α  and 2α , are fixed parameters.  
(i) A paternalist government imposes a lower marginal income tax rate than the 
welfarist government on the less positional type and a higher marginal income tax on 
the more positional type.  
(ii) If all consumers are identical and share the common degree of positionality 
1 2α α α= = , then '( ) '( )i i i iP WT w l T w l α= =  for all i. 
  
Under the conditions of Corollary 1, the common marginal income tax rate decided by 
the welfarist government would equal the economy-wide average of the two rates 
(one for each productivity type) introduced by the paternalist government. The second 
part of the corollary is a very strong result, as it reconciles the paternalist approach 
with results in earlier studies on optimal taxation based on representative agent 
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models with a welfarist government.9 If all consumers were identical, the paternalist 
government would implement exactly the same marginal tax policy as its welfarist 
counterpart, although for a different reason. As such, and given the redistribution 
between types, it does not matter at all whether or not the government respects the 
consumer preferences for envy or jealousy – the marginal tax policy implications 
would be the same in both cases. 
 
3.2 Corrective and Redistributive Taxation under Asymmetric Information 
 
If the self-selection constraint binds, we are back in the second-best setting where 
asymmetric information prevents the government from redistributing through 
productivity type-specific lump-sum taxes. As such, the marginal tax structure will 
reflect both the self-selection constraint and a motive for correction (for market 
failures in the welfarist case and behavioral failures in the paternalist case). The 
welfare effects of increased reference consumption in the paternalist and welfarist 
cases, i.e., equations (11a) and (11b), will then change to read 
 
( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )P x xv vx l σ σ l α σ α σ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
∂
= − + = − + + +
∂
L ,                  (12a) 
(1 )
d
W N
x
α αγ
α
∂ −
=
∂ −
L
,                        (12b) 
 
where 2 2 2 1ˆˆ ˆ( )( ) / ( )d xv Nα l σ α α γ∆= + −  is an indicator of the difference in the degree 
of positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability type. If the mimicker is 
more (less) positional than the low-ability type, so that 2 1ˆ ( )α α> < , then 
0 ( 0)dα > < . 
                                                 
9 A utility function consistent with the second part of the corollary has been analyzed by Ljungqvist and 
Uhlig (2000) and later discussed by Dupor and Liu (2003), 
 
1 1( ) ( (1 ) ( ))
1 1
i i i
i i ix x x x xU z z
β βα α α
φ φ
β β
− −− + −
− −
− −
−
= =  for i=1,2, 
where α , β , and φ  are fixed parameters. The parameter α is interpretable as the common degree of 
positionality. 
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Equation (12b) was originally derived by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) 
and shows that a welfarist government has two different motives for adjusting x  
through tax policy: internalize the positional externality (captured by α ) and relax the 
self-selection constraint by exploiting that the relative consumption concerns may 
differ between the mimicker and the low-ability type (captured by dα ). The latter 
effect provides an incentive for the welfarist government to relax the self-selection 
constraint through an increase in x  if the mimicker is more positional than the low-
ability type ( 2 1αˆ α> ), and through a decrease in x  if the low-ability type is more 
positional than the mimicker ( 2 1αˆ α< ). The paternalist government, on the other 
hand, is not concerned with the positional externality per se, which explains why α  
does not appear in equation (12a). As such, the partial welfare effect of an increase in 
x  faced by the paternalist government is due solely to the self-selection constraint. 
Furthermore, for a paternalist government, it is not an issue whether a mimicker is 
more or less positional than the low-productivity type, since x  has no direct effect on 
the objective that the government imposes on the low-productivity type. Instead, what 
matters is just that x  directly affects the self-selection constraint through 2U  and 2Uˆ , 
which, in turn, explains equation (12a). 
 
In what follows, we distinguish between marginal rates of substitution based on the 
functions ( )iv ⋅  and ( ) ( )i iv σ⋅ + ⋅ . If based on ( )iv ⋅ , the marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and private consumption for productivity type i and the mimicker is 
given by  
 ,,x 0
i
P i z
z i
x
vMRS
v
= >  for i=1,2, and 
2
,2
,x 2
vˆˆ 0
vˆ
P z
z
x
MRS = > , (MRS-P) 
respectively, whereas the corresponding marginal rates of substitution based on 
( ) ( )i iv σ⋅ + ⋅  become 
 ,,x 0
i
W i z
z i i
x
vMRS
v σ∆
= >
+
 for i=1,2, and 
2
,2
,x 2 2
vˆˆ 0
ˆ ˆv
W z
z
x
MRS
σ∆
= >
+
. (MRS-W) 
Now, to be able to shorten the notation in the subsequent analyses, note that the 
optimal tax policy implicit in the original Stiglitz (1982) model (the version with fixed 
before-tax wage rates) follows as the special case where we disregard the effect of x  
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on the Lagrangean, i.e., where we set / / 0P Wx x∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ =L L . If based on the utility 
functions ( )iv ⋅  and the associated MRS-P-functions, the optimal marginal income tax 
rates in the original Stiglitz (1982) model can be written as 
 
2
1 ,1 ,2
,x ,x1 1
vˆ ˆP Px
P z zMRS MRSn w
l
τ φ
γ
 = −   and 
2 0Pτ = ,                      (13a) 
  
and as follows if based on the utility functions ( ) ( )i iv σ⋅ + ⋅  and associated MRS-W-
functions: 
 
2 2
1 ,1 ,2
,x ,x1 1
ˆ ˆ(v ) ˆW Wx
W z zMRS MRSn w
l σ
τ φ
γ
∆+  = −   and 
2 0Wτ = .                     (13b) 
 
The implications of equations (13a) and (13b) are well known from previous studies: 
In the original two-type model with fixed before-tax wage rates, there is an incentive 
to relax the self-selection constraint through marginal income taxation of the low-
productivity type. In doing this, one utilizes the difference in the marginal value 
attached to leisure between the mimicker and the low-productivity type, while there 
are no such effect for the high-productivity type for which the marginal income tax 
rate is instead zero. The reason for presenting these formulas here is that the variables 
1
Pτ  and 
2
Pτ  are part of the paternalist policy characterized below, whereas the 
variables 1Wτ  and 
2
Wτ  play a corresponding role for a welfarist policy. Consider 
Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that the self-selection constraint binds ( 0l > ) and that the 
relative consumption concerns are based on mean value comparisons. The optimal 
marginal income tax rates implemented by a paternalist government can then be 
written as 
 
1 2 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
ˆ
'( ) (1 ) (1 ) PP P P
n nT w l
w n N
l σ σ
τ τ α α ∆ ∆
+
= + − + −   
 
2 1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
ˆ
'( ) (1 ) PP
n nT w l
w n N
l σ σ
α α ∆ ∆
+
= − − , 
 18 
 
Paternalism Against Veblen 
where ,, / 0
i P i
P z cMRSl l γ= >  for i=1,2, while a welfarist government implements the 
following marginal income tax rates: 
 '( ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
1
d
i i i i i
W W W W dT w l
ατ α τ α τ
α
= + − − − −
−
   for i=1,2. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Note first that the tax formulas presented in Proposition 1 follow as the special case 
where 0l = , in which also 1 2 1 2 1 2 0dP P W W P Pτ τ τ τ l l α= = = = = = = . The welfarist 
formulas in Proposition 2 can also be found in Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 
(2008) and reflect three basic incentives for tax policy: (i) relaxation of the self-
selection constraint by exploiting that the low-productivity type and the mimicker 
attach different marginal values to leisure, i.e., through 1Wτ , (ii) internalization of 
positional externalities as reflected in the average degree of positionality, α , and (iii) 
relaxation of the self-selection constraint by exploiting that a mimicker may either be 
more or less positional than the low-productivity type as measured by dα . If 1 0Wτ >  
(as in the original Stiglitz 1982 model where all consumers have the same 
preferences), and since 2 0Wτ = , it follows that the corrective component in the 
formula for the low-productivity type, i.e., the second term on the right-hand side, is 
scaled down by the factor 1(1 ) 1Wτ− < . The reason is that the fraction of the marginal 
income that is already taxed away for other reasons does not give rise to any 
positional externalities. Note also that the welfarist government implements lower 
(higher) marginal income tax rates for both productivity types than it would otherwise 
have done if the mimicker is more (less) positional than the low-productivity type, 
ceteris paribus, i.e., if 0 ( 0)dα > < , in which case an increase (decrease) in the 
reference consumption contributes to relax the self-selection constraint. 
 
The paternalist formulas are novel and written in a format comparable to the 
corresponding welfarist formulas. As such, there are three basic policy incentives here 
as well: (i) relaxation of the self-selection constraint by exploiting that the low-
productivity type and the mimicker attach different marginal values to leisure, as 
reflected in 1Pτ , (ii) correction for behavioral failures, and (iii) relaxation of the self-
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selection constraint through policy-induced changes in the reference consumption. 
The first two aspects are reminiscent to their counterparts in the welfarist case in 
terms of qualitative implications for tax policy, whereas the third aspect is different. 
The first term on the right-hand side of the expression for 1 1'( )PT w l  is again the 
standard incentive for marginal income taxation of low-productivity individuals found 
in the original Stiglitz (1982) model, although in this case it is based on utility 
function ( )iv ⋅  instead of ( ) ( )i iv σ⋅ + ⋅ . With this modification, the component 1Pτ  in 
the paternalist tax formula for the low-productivity type is interpretable in the same 
general way as 1Wτ  in the corresponding welfarist formula. There is no similar 
component in the expression for marginal income taxation of the high-productivity 
type, since 2 0Pτ = . 
 
The motive to correct for behavioral failures is captured by the second term in the 
formula for 1 1'( )PT w l  and the first term in the formula for 
2 2'( )PT w l . As explained in 
the context of Proposition 1, this behavioral failure is captured by the individual’s 
own degree of positionality. By analogy to the welfarist case, the corrective tax 
component imposed on the high-productivity type is the same as under first-best 
taxation, i.e., 2α , whereas the corrective component is scaled down for the low-
productivity type. The intuition behind the scale factor is, in this case, that marginal 
income taxes imposed for other reasons than correction will, nevertheless, eliminate 
part of the behavioral failure that the government wants to correct for. As such, if the 
fraction 1Pτ  of an additional dollar is already taxed away, only the fraction 
11 Pτ−  may 
be used for private consumption. 
 
The final component of each paternalist tax formula is connected to the welfare effect 
of increased reference consumption in equation (12a), i.e., /P x∂ ∂L , as well as to 
direct effects of ix  on the self-selection constraint. As such, it reflects an incentive to 
relax the self-selection constraint through policy-induced changes in the reference 
consumption, and differs in a fundamental way from its counterpart in the welfarist 
case. Whereas the corresponding effect under a welfarist tax policy takes the same 
form and sign for both productivity types (where the sign depends on whether the 
mimicker is more or less positional than the low-productivity type), it differs in sign 
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between the productivity types under a paternalist tax policy. More specifically, and 
although /P x∂ ∂L  cannot be signed unambiguously, the final term in the tax formula 
for the low-productivity type is positive, while it is negative in the formula for the 
high-productivity type. This result follows because ix  affects the self-selection 
constraint through two channels, i.e., a direct effect and an indirect effect via x . 
These two effects partly cancel out, leaving a positive net effect in the formula for the 
low-productivity type and a negative net effect in the formula for the high-
productivity type (see the Appendix for technical details). The intuition is that the 
government may relax the self-selection constraint by encouraging the relative 
consumption concerns among high-productivity individuals while discouraging them 
for low-productivity individuals to make mimicking less attractive. 
 
Therefore, and if we assume that 1 0Pτ >  in accordance with the Stiglitz (1982) model 
where the consumers share a common utility function, the following result is an 
immediate consequence of Proposition 2: 
 
Corollary 2: With a paternalist government and under mean-value comparisons, the 
optimal second-best policy satisfies 
 1 1 1'( )PT w l α>  
 2 2 2'( )PT w l α< . 
 
Corollary 2 contains a strong message: to relax the self-selection constraint, a 
paternalist government will tax the income of the low-productivity type at a higher 
marginal rate and the income of the high-productivity type at a lower marginal rate 
than motivated by pure (first best) correction for behavioral failures. 
 
Finally, the main insights from the first-best analysis prevails also in the second-best 
scenario, namely that there are no reasons to expect the optimal marginal income tax 
rates to be smaller with a paternalist government than with a welfarist one, despite the 
fact that relative consumption concerns are likely to imply higher marginal income 
taxes than without such concerns.  
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4. Extension with Alternative Reference Points 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, it is by no means obvious whom people compare 
their own consumption with. The benchmark model in Sections 3 and 4 simply 
follows the convention in most earlier literature in assuming that each consumer 
compares his/her own consumption with the economy-wide average. Yet, some 
existing empirical evidence points in the direction of more narrow social comparisons, 
such that individuals compare their own consumption with that of people who are 
either similar to and/or wealthier than themselves. As such, we will here examine how 
the results presented above will change, and hence the robustness of the above 
findings, if the mean value comparison is replaced with within-type and upward 
comparisons. As will be demonstrated, the main qualitative insights continue to hold 
also with these alternative reference points. 
 
4.1 Within-type Comparisons and Optimal Income Taxation 
 
With type-specific social comparisons, the reference consumption will also differ 
between types in the sense that 1, 1rx x=  and 2, 2rx x= . The utility function faced by an 
individual of productivity type i can then be written as (x , ) ( )i i i i i iU v z σ= + ∆ , where 
the relative consumption is given by ,ri i ix x∆ = −  for i=1,2. Also, recall that each 
individual consumer is assumed to behave as an atomistic agent in the sense of 
treating the relevant reference measure as exogenous. The individual’s first-order 
condition for work hours will then remain as in equation (5), with the modification 
that the reference measure is type-specific. 
 
We assume that the high-productivity mimicker, who pretends to be a low-
productivity individual, compares his/her own consumption with the reference point 
characterizing the low-productivity type, meaning that the utility of the mimicker is 
given by 
2 2 1 1 2 1ˆ (x ,1 ) ( )U v lφ σ= − + ∆ . 
The decision-problem of the paternalist government then implies maximizing the 
following Lagrangean with respect to 1l , 1x , 2l , and 2x : 
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1 2 2 2 2ˆ ( )i i i iP
i
v v v U U n w l xµ l γ  = + − + − + −    ∑L . (14)   
  
The first-order conditions for 1l  and 2l  remain as in equations (9a) and (9c), while 
those for 1x  and 2x  become 
 
1 2 2 1
1,
ˆ ˆ( ) 0Px x rv v n x
l σ γ∆
∂
− + − + =
∂
L ,                       (15a) 
( ) 2 2 2 2, 0Px rv n x
µ l lσ γ∆
∂
+ + − + =
∂
L ,                       (15b) 
where the final term in each equation measures the partial social welfare effect of 
increased reference consumption, 
2 2 2 2
1,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0P xr vx
lσ lα σ∆ ∆
∂
= = + >
∂
L ,                       (16a) 
2 2 2 2
2, ( ) 0
P
xr vx
lσ lα σ∆ ∆
∂
= − = − + <
∂
L .                       (16b) 
 
For purposes of comparison, we also define the corresponding decision problem faced 
by a welfarist government, whose Lagrangean is given by 
 
 1 2 2 2 2ˆ ( )i i i iW
i
U U U U U n w l xµ l γ  = + − + − + −    ∑L . (17) 
  
The first-order conditions for 1x  and 2x  can be written as (while the first-order 
conditions for 1l  and 2l  are again given by equations [9a] and [9c]) 
 
1 1 2 2 1
1,
ˆ ˆ( ) 0Wx x rv v n x
σ l σ γ∆ ∆
∂
+ − + − + =
∂
L
,                       (18a) 
( )( )2 2 2 2, 0Wx rv n xµ l σ γ∆
∂
+ + − + =
∂
L
,                       (18b) 
where 
1 1 2 2 2 1 1
1
1, 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ( )( )
1 1
dd
W x
r
n v
n
x
γ α l σ α α α αγ
α α
∆∂ − + + − −= =
∂ − −
L
,                    (19a) 
2
2
2, 2 01
W
r nx
αγ
α
∂
= − <
∂ −
L
.                        (19b) 
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In equation (19a), 2 2 2 1 1ˆˆ ˆ( )( ) /dd xv nα l σ α α γ∆= + −  is a slightly modified measure of 
the difference in the degree of positionality between the mimicker and the low-ability 
type, which is interpretable in the same general way as its counterpart in Section 3. 
 
Let us once again begin by considering a simplified version of the model in which the 
self-selection constraint does not bind, i.e., where 0l = , meaning that the optimal tax 
policies will implement first-best (full information) resource allocations. We derive 
the following result: 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that the self-selection constraint does not bind ( 0l = ) and 
that the relative consumption concerns are based on within-type comparisons. The 
optimal marginal income tax rates implemented by the paternalist and welfarist 
governments can then be written as 
 
'( )
'( )
i i i
P
i i i
W
T w l
T w l
α
α
=
=
 
respectively, for i=1,2. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 3 does not imply that the marginal income tax rate for each productivity 
type will take the same numerical value irrespective of whether the government is 
paternalist or welfarist, since the degrees of positionality are typically endogenous 
variables (except for very specific forms of the utility function). It means, instead, that 
the marginal tax rates are based on exactly the same policy rule in both cases. The 
intuition is that iα  measures the relative consumption concerns of an individual of 
productivity type i (which determines the behavioral failure that the paternalist 
government wants to correct for) as well as the value of the marginal externality that 
this individual imposes on referent others (which the welfarist government wants to 
correct for). As such, a paternalist and welfarist government will use the same policy 
rule for corrective taxation, although for different reasons. 
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Turning to the second-best setting with a binding self-selection constraint, the policy 
rules presented in Proposition 3 will be modified, since both the paternalist and 
welfarist government have incentives to relax this constraint through tax policy. This 
is described in Proposition 4 below: 
 
Proposition 4. Suppose that the self-selection constraint binds ( 0l > ), and that the 
relative consumption concerns are based on within-type comparisons. The optimal 
marginal income tax rates implemented by a paternalist government can then be 
written as 
 1 1 1 1 1'( ) (1 )P P PT w l τ τ α= + −  
 2 2 2'( )PT w l α= ,  
while a welfarist government implements the following marginal income tax rates: 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'( ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
1
dd
W W W W ddT w l
ατ α τ α τ
α
= + − − − −
−
 
 2 2 2'( )WT w l α= . 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
First, note that the marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-productivity 
type is still based on the first-best policy rule, measured by the type-specific degree of 
positionality, both in the paternalist and welfarist cases. This is so because if the 
relative consumption concerns are based on within-type comparisons, the allocation 
chosen for the high-productivity type will not directly affect the utility faced by the 
mimicker, i.e., 1,rx  does not directly depend on 2x . Second, the policy rules for 
marginal income taxation of the low-productivity type closely resemble those under 
mean value comparisons, with the exception that the externalities are type-specific in 
the welfarist case. As such, we can see that the corrective component of the tax 
formula falls short of 1α  both with paternalist and welfarist policy. 
 
Finally, note that the third policy incentive that we described in the context of mean 
value comparisons (i.e., policy-induced changes in the reference consumption to relax 
the self-selection constraint) does not affect the marginal income tax rates 
implemented by a paternalist government under within-type comparisons. The 
 25 
 
Paternalism Against Veblen 
intuition is simply that direct effects of 1x  and 2x  on the self-selection constraint 
exactly cancel out the corresponding indirect effects via 1,rx  and 2,rx , respectively, 
meaning that the paternalist government cannot relax the self-selection constraint 
through policy-induced changes in the levels of reference consumption. On the other 
hand, in the welfarist tax formula for the low-productivity type, there is an incentive 
to relax the self-selection constraint through changes in the level of 1,rx , which 
depends on the difference in the degree of positionality between the mimicker and the 
low-productivity type. This component has the same interpretation as in the 
corresponding tax formula based on mean-value comparisons. 
 
4.2 Briefly on Upward Comparisons 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, Micheletto (2011) compares paternalist and 
welfarist tax policy under upward social comparisons. He considers a model where 
each consumer compares his/her consumption with that of the adjacent higher 
productivity type, meaning that individuals of the highest productivity type are not 
concerned with their relative consumption. As such, he finds that individuals of the 
highest productivity type face lower marginal income tax rates under paternalism than 
welfarism, since these individuals cause positional externalities without having 
preferences for relative consumption. The opposite holds for individuals of the lowest 
productivity type, who are concerned with their relative consumption without causing 
any positional externalities. Therefore, upward comparisons constitute an extreme 
case in the sense of giving rise to potentially much larger differences between 
paternalist and welfarist policy than the comparison forms addressed above. 
 
We will consider another, and equally plausible, variant of the upward comparison 
where all consumers compare their own consumption with that of the high-
productivity type. A similar approach to modeling upward comparisons was employed 
by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010) under the assumption of a welfarist 
government, and we shall here contrast the marginal income tax rates chosen by a 
welfarist government with the marginal income tax rates implemented by a paternalist 
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government.10 As such, we have a common reference measure for all consumers, 
2rx x= , which means that only the high-productivity type gives rise to positional 
externalities, whereas all consumers are concerned with their relative consumption 
(i.e., the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses motive also exists among high-productivity 
individuals). Compared with the first-order conditions of the benchmark model in 
Sections 2 and 3, the only differences are that 1/ 0rx x∂ ∂ =  (instead of 1 /n N ) and 
2/ 1rx x∂ ∂ =  (instead of 2 /n N ), resulting in a slight modification compared with 
equations (9b) and (9d). 
 
As we have seen above, the first-best policy rules for the paternalist government 
always take the same form, i.e., '( )i i iPT w l α=  for i=1,2, irrespective of comparison 
form. In addition, and since all positional externalities are generated by the high-
productivity type under upward comparison, a first-best policy for a welfarist 
government does not contain any corrective tax imposed on the low-productivity type. 
Therefore, we settle here by briefly characterizing the second-best policy under a 
binding self-selection constraint. 
 
Proposition 5. Suppose that the self-selection constraint binds ( 0l > ) and that the 
relative consumption concerns are based on upward comparisons such that 2rx x= . 
The optimal marginal income tax rates implemented by a paternalist government can 
then be written as 
 1 1 1 1 1'( ) (1 )P P PT w l τ τ α= + −  
 
2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
ˆ'( ) (1 ) PPT w l n w
l
α α σ∆= − − , 
where 2 0Pl > ,
11 while a welfarist government implements the following marginal 
income tax rates: 
 1 1 1'( )W WT w l τ=  
                                                 
10 Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2010) analyze an OLG model where each consumer lives for two 
periods. In their model, all young consumers compare their current consumption with the current 
consumption of the young high-productivity type, and all old consumers compare their current 
consumption with the current consumption of the old high-ability type.  
11 See Proposition 1. 
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2
2 2
2 2
1'( )
1
d
W
NT w l
n
α α
w α
−
=
−
, 
where 
2 2
2
1 ( / )( )
(1 )
dN nα α αw
α
− + −
=
−
. 
  
The proof of Proposition 5 is analogous to the proofs of Propositions 2 and 4 and is 
therefore omitted. With a welfarist policy objective, there is no corrective component 
in the marginal income tax rate faced by the low-productivity type, since low-
productivity individuals do not generate any positional externalities, whereas the 
marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-productivity type reflects both 
externality correction and an incentive to relax the self-selection constraint through 
policy-induced changes in the level of reference consumption (the sign of the latter 
effect is ambiguous and depends on dα ). 
 
Turning to the marginal income tax rates implemented by the paternalist government, 
at least three things are worth noting. First, the paternalist government has an 
incentive to use corrective taxation for both productivity types since both are 
concerned with their relative consumption (even if only the high-productivity type 
contributes to the externality). Second, if we assume (as we did above) that 1 0Pτ > , 
the marginal income tax rate is higher for the low-productivity type and lower for the 
high-productivity type than would follow from a first-best tax policy to correct for 
behavioral failures, i.e., we have 1 1 1'( )PT w l α>  and 
2 2 2'( )PT w l α< . Third, while the 
welfarist results are also close to those presented in Micheletto (2011), the paternalist 
tax policy presented above differs from his results as he assumes that the highest 
productivity type is not concerned with relative consumption (in which case the first 
term on the right-hand side of the tax formula vanishes). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes the tax policy implications of relative consumption concerns from 
the perspective of a paternalist government, which does not share the consumer 
preferences for such concerns, and also compares the policy outcome with that 
following from a traditional welfarist government. The analysis is based on a model 
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with two productivity types and nonlinear income taxation, where we examine the 
first-best corrective tax policy implemented by each type of government as well as the 
second-best policies that follow under asymmetric information about individual 
productivity.  
 
There is one major take-away message from the present paper: Although the tax 
policy motives differ in a fundamental way between paternalist and welfarist 
governments, the policy rules for optimal income taxation may be remarkably similar. 
Indeed, in a first-best setting, where the self-selection constraint does not bind, we 
show that welfarist and paternalist governments implement exactly the same policy 
rules for marginal income taxation if either of the following two conditions are 
fulfilled: 1. The relative consumption concerns are driven by mean value comparisons 
and the consumers are equally positional. 2. The relative consumption concerns are 
driven by within-type comparisons (regardless of whether the consumers are equally 
positional). The intuition is that the externality that each individual imposes on other 
people (which is of importance for the welfarist government) coincides with the 
individual’s own behavioral failure as perceived by the paternalist government. As 
such, it is not necessarily of major importance for the policy outcome whether the 
government aims at correcting for positional externalities or tries to make the 
consumers behave as if they were not concerned with their relative consumption.  
 
In a second-best world, there are somewhat larger differences in marginal tax policy 
between the paternalist and welfarist governments, since the welfare effect of 
increased reference consumption only works through the self-selection constraint in 
the paternalist case. The qualitative differences between first-best and second-best 
taxation are also typically sharper in the paternalist case, where the incentives to relax 
the self-selection constraint imply a higher marginal income tax rate for the low-
productivity type and a lower marginal income tax rate for the high-productivity type 
than motivated solely by correction for behavioral failures. The corresponding policy 
incentive for a welfarist government is ambiguous and depends on whether the 
mimicker is more or less positional than the low-productivity type. Nevertheless, the 
major conclusion above holds also in the second-best case, i.e., there are no a priori 
reasons why social comparisons would affect the marginal income tax rates more with 
a welfarist than a paternalist government. Moreover, we show that this conclusion 
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prevails also with alternative reference points such that individuals instead compare 
their consumption with others of their own type or solely with those displaying the 
highest consumption level.  
 
Appendix 
 
Mean value comparisons 
 
In the paternalist case, the partial welfare effect of increased reference consumption 
follows from differentiation of PL  with respect to x , i.e., 
 
 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )P x xv vx
l σ σ l α σ α σ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
∂
   = − + = − + + +   ∂
L , (A1)  
 
which is equation (12a). For the welfarist government, the corresponding expression 
reads 
  
 
1 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )( ) ( )
W
x x x
x
v v v
σ µσ l σ σ
σ α µ l σ α l σ α
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
∆ ∆ ∆
∂
 = − − + − + ∂
= − + − + + + +
L
 . (A2) 
 
Solving equation (9b’) for 1 1xv σ∆+  and equation (9d’) for 
2 2( )( )xvµ l σ∆+ + , 
respectively and then substituting into equation (A2) gives equation (12b). 
 
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 
 
Consider first the low-productivity type. For the paternalist case, combining equations 
(9a) and (9b) gives 
 
1 1 ,1 2 ,1 ,2
,x ,x ,x
1
,1 2 2 2
,x
ˆˆ( )
ˆ ˆ( )
P P P
z x z z
P
z
n w MRS v MRS MRS
nMRS
N
γ l φ
lσ l σ σ∆ ∆ ∆
 − = − 
 
+ − − + 
 
. (A3)  
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Then, by using equation (5) to derive 
 1 ,1 1 1 1 ,1 1, ,'( )
P P
z c P z cw MRS w T w l MRS α− = − , 
substituting into equation (A3) and rearranging gives the marginal income tax rate for 
the low-productivity type in Proposition 2 under a paternalist policy. The marginal 
income tax rate for the high-productivity type can be derived in the same general way 
by combining equations (5), (9c), and (9d). 
 
With a welfarist policy, the marginal income tax rate for the low-productivity type is 
based on equations (9a) and (9b’). Combining these equations gives 
 
          
1
1 1 ,1 2 2 ,1 ,2 ,1
,x ,x ,x ,x
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )W W W W Wz x z z z
nn w MRS v MRS MRS MRS
N x
γ l σ φ∆
∂ − = + − −  ∂
L
. (A4) 
 
Using 1 ,1 1 1 1,x '( )
W
z Ww MRS w T w l− =  and the expression for /W x∂ ∂L  in equation (12b), 
substituting into equation (A4) and rearranging gives the marginal income tax rate 
implemented for the low-productivity type in Proposition 2 under a welfarist policy. 
Again, the marginal income tax rate of the high-productivity type can be derived in an 
analogous way by combining equations (5), (9c), and (9d’). 
 
Finally, note that the marginal income tax rates in Proposition 1 follow as the special 
case where 0l = .█ 
 
Within-type comparisons 
 
By using equation (14), we can immediately derive 
 
2 2 2 2
1,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0P xr vx
lσ lα σ∆ ∆
∂
= = + >
∂
L                       (A5a) 
2 2 2 2
2, ( ) 0
P
xr vx
lσ lα σ∆ ∆
∂
= − = − + <
∂
L                       (A5b) 
 
for the paternalist case. Similarly, for the welfarist case, differentiation of equation 
(17) with respect to each type-specific measure of reference consumption gives 
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1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
1,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )W x xr v vx
σ lσ σ α l σ α∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
∂
= − + = − + + +
∂
L
                     (A6a) 
2 2 2 2
2, ( ) ( )( ) 0
W
xr vx
µ l σ µ l σ α∆ ∆
∂
= − + = − + + <
∂
L
.                     (A6b) 
   
Solving equation (18a) for 1 1xv σ∆+ , substituting into equation (A6a), and rearranging 
gives equation (19a). Similarly, solving equation (18b) for 2 2( )( )xvµ l σ∆+ + , 
substituting into equation (A6b), and rearranging gives equation (19b). 
 
Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 
 
Consider again the low-productivity type. Starting with the paternalist case, we use 
equations (5), (9a), and (15a) to derive 
 
1 1 1 1 2 ,1 ,2 1 ,1 1
,x ,x ,
ˆˆ'( ) P P PP x z z z cn w T w l v MRS MRS n MRSγ l φ γ α = − +  . (A7) 
 
Rearranging gives the marginal income tax rate for the low-productivity type in 
Proposition 4 under a paternalist policy. The marginal income tax rate for the high-
productivity type can be derived analogously. 
 
In the welfarist case, we use equations (5), (9a), and (18a) to derive 
 
1
1 1 1 1 2 2 ,1 ,2 ,1
,x ,x ,x 1,
ˆˆ ˆ'( ) ( ) W W W WW x z z z r
nn w T w l v MRS MRS MRS
N x
γ l σ φ∆
∂ = + − −  ∂
L
     (A8) 
 
for the low-productivity type. Substituting equation (19a) into equation (A8) and 
rearranging gives the marginal income tax rate for the low-productivity type in 
Proposition 4. Analogous calculations based on equations (5), (9c), (18b), and (19b) 
give the marginal income tax rate of the high-productivity type. 
 
Finally, the marginal income tax rates in Proposition 3 follow as special cases of those 
presented in Proposition 4 when 0l = .█ 
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